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Summary  findings
Between 1990 and 1992 in Slovenia, recipients of  unemployment, its duration,  the amount spent on Ul
unemployment insurance (Ul) benefits tended to  benefits, and the inefficiencies generated by raising taxes
remain (formally) unemployed until their benefits  to finance unemployment insurance. At the same time,
expired, before taking a job. Institutional set-up  reducing the duration  of benefits would not impair job
suggests, and labor surveys show, that many of the  matches or crowd out jobs for nonrecipients.
recipients were actually working while collecting Ul  True, despite increased efficiency generally, the
benefits. In the spirit, if not in the letter of the law, the  workers with the least job mobility might suffer
Ul system was abused.  hardships - and might need social assistance. The
Vodopivec shows that the escape rate of the  tradeoff between increased hardships for the least mobile
recipients of unemployment compensation to  group and greater efficiency generally would have to be
employment increased dramatically just before the  resolved in the political sphere. Redesigning the system
potential exhaustion of unemployment benefits - and  for better targeting would be less controversial. One way
decreased equally dramatically after benefits were  to reduce Ul spending without seriously curtailing
exhausted. When grouped by the potential duration  of  incentives to work would be to reduce the benefits in
benefits, unemployment length varies significantly. The  proportion  to earnings from irregular work. Another
unemployed with longer potential benefits stay  possibility is stricter monitoring of the job searches of the
unemployed longer. Because these groups differ in  unemployed. To reduce spending and make "double
their characteristics (for example, in age), this does not  dipping" less attractive, old-age insurance could be
prove the "waiting behavior" of the recipients.  removed from the package of benefits the UI system
However, exits to employment dramatically increase  offers. And counselors who help the unemployed find
just before exhaustion  -and  that does prove waiting  jobs (and who may thus develop a close relationship witlh
behavior. The pattern of an increased escape rate just  them) should perhaps not be expected to be able to make
before benefits are exhausted and its dramatic fall  impartial decisions about disqualification for benefits;
thereafter  is more rigorously demonstrated using  someone else should do that.
hazard model estimation.  In addition to better targeting, a "benefit transfer
Possibilities for informal employment are abundant  program" - a voluntary program that converts Ul
in Slovenia, and the environment of transition  benefits (through vouchers) into hiring subsidies-
economies generally seems conducive to misuse of the  seems particularly attractive for Slovenia and other
Ul system. Legislative loopholes and failure to enforce  transition economies. In a way, such a program would
the labor code allowed the unemployed to work and to  legalize the "double-dipping" that has been taking place
collect benefits. And the monitoring of job searches  in Slovenia and possibly elsewhere. It would legalize
was lax.  practices that have undermined the system's credibility.
Vodopivec's calculations suggest that reducing the  But it might improve fiscal savings while sustaining the
duration of benefits would reduce the incidence of  incentive to find jobs.
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5.  Policy implicationsAdequate  social safety nets are often cited as an important  factor in ensuring sustainability  of
reforms  in transition  economies.  Both  inexperience  and budgetary  restraints  imposed  by falling  production
make the designing of a safety net compatible  with a market economy  an especially  challenging  task.
Unemployment  insurance  (UI) is one part of this safety  net. Regarding  Ul systems, one may argue that
their protection has been too generous in some economies and too meager in others. For example,
Poland's 1989 Ul law granted benefits  to anyone, regardless  of previous work history, who registered
with an employment  office. In Hungary (during 1989-92)  and Slovenia,  the maximum  potential  benefit
duration  has been  two years, with possible  extensions  for workers  of pensionable  age. This is comparable
to the maximum  duration in Western Europe but much longer than in the U.S.  On the other hand, in
many  of the successor  states  of the Soviet  Union,  the Ul benefit has been minimal  with potential  duration
of six months and the level of benefit at, or even below, subsistence.
Especially when unemployment  insurance is generous, there is a danger that it may create
perverse incentives  to take a job.  The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate  that during 1990-92,  the
Slovenian  Ul system  created  such perverse  incentives:  many  Ul recipients  waited until  their benefits  were
about to expire before taking a job.  This paper shows that the escape rate of the recipients  of Ul to
employment  dramatically  increased  just before the potential  exhaustion  of unemployment  benefits, and
equally  dramatically  decreased  after  benefits  were exhausted. This pattern  may  be observed  from plotting
survival in unemployment  as a function  of time.  When  grouped by their potential  duration of benefits,
unemployment  varies significantly  among  groups. Unemployed  with longer  potential  duration  of benefits
stay unemployed  longer.  Because the groups differ in their characteristics,  this does not prove the
"waiting  behavior"of the recipients. However, exits to employment  dramatically  increase  just before
exhaustion  -- which proves waiting behavior. The pattern of increased  escape rate just before  benefits
exhaustion  is more rigorously  demonstrated  using hazard model estimation.
Section 1 provides an overview  of labor market trends during the Slovenian  transition.
Section  2 discusses  the working  of the unemployment  insurance  system and addresses  the factors  that maycontribute  to discouraging  exits to employment. After discussing  data sources in Section  3, the paper
analyzes -- both non-parametrically and parametrically -- the effects of unemployment duration in Section
4.  Policy implications  are discussed  in Section  5.
1.  RECENT LABOR  MARKET  TRENDS
Slovenia's  reforms during transition shattered  job security,  replaced  the previous rigid system  of
wage determination  by collective  bargaining,  and strengthened  financial  discipline  that squeezed  subsides
for ailing enterprises  (for a description  of labor market  policies during the transition, see Vodopivec  and
Hribar-Milic, 1993). All that has produced  dramatic  changes  in the working of the labor market.  Not
only the level of employment  and unemployment,  but also the transition rates among different labor
market states and wages have been severely affected.  Employment has been drastically reduced,
disproportionately  affecting  both young and old workers, as well as the less educated. Unemployment
has soared, rising from its virtual absence  in the mid-1980s  to double  digits in the 1990s. The probability
of an employed  worker becoming unemployed  has sharply increased, while  the probability  of changing
jobs has declined  considerably. The probability  of finding  a job after being unemployed  has declined.
To put the analysis  of exits from unemployment  to employment  in a broader  context, these developments
are summarized  below.
Transition drastically reduced both real wages and employment.  With the exception of
extraordinary 1989 (when hyperinflation  artificially decreased costs and increased profitability and
wages), real wages fell considerably. They  fell by a quarter in 1990  alone, and then  further in both 1991
and 1992  (Table 1, panel A).  And despite the reduction in real wages, differences  in wage distribution
have  substantially  widened  (Orazem  and Vodopivec,  1995). After remaining  relatively stable  from 1987
through 1990, employment  in the formal sector of Slovenia  fell by 7 percent during 1990 and a further
9 percent  during 1991, for a cumulative  decline  over the 1990-1991  period of 15 percent (Table 1, panel
2B).  Both young workers and older workers have been particularly affected:  young workers have been
frozen out of jobs, and more workers have retired than usual, many under the government-sponsored
early retirement  program (see Abraham  and Vodopivec,  1993).
The destinations  of exits from employment  have also changed  profoundly. Prior to 1990, it was
rare for any employed  person to leave  his or her job for unemployment.  The yearly  job-to-unemployment
exit rate -- the share of employed  persons  who, over a 12  month  period, exited from employment  directly
into unemployment  -- was only 0.4 percent in 1987  and had risen only to 0.8 percent by 1989  (Table 1,
panel C).  Other job exits, to retirement and out-of-the-labor-force,  were remarkably  steady.  During
the transition, exit rates to unemployment  and out-of-the-labor-force,  including  to retirement, increased
sharply.' Most strikingly,  the exit rate to unemployment  increased  to 4 percent by 1991. The tightening
of the market is reflected also in a decline in the job changing  rate.  In 1987, 7.2 percent of those
employed  at the start of the calendar  year changed  jobs during the year; by 1991, this rate had fallen to
4.9 percent, a decline of about a third.
Another dramatic development  has been a surge of unemployment. Both because of the large
increase in inflows into unemployment  and the substantial  decrease in the probability that a typical
unemployed  person will find a job, the number increased  from 14,068 unemployed  persons  at the start
of calendar year 1987, to 93,036 at the start of 1992 (Table 1, panel D, and figure 1).  Data on
unemployment  inflows shed additional light (Table 1, panel E).  The number of persons entering
unemployment  because  their enterprise had declared  bankruptcy  grew from 1,472 in 1989  to 8,674 in
1990 and 18,852 in 1991. In mid-1991,  however, the government  had suspended  the initiation  of new
bankruptcies, and the number of persons entering unemployment  due to employer bankruptcy had
I  Changes  to Slovenian  law  introduced  in 1989  made  it easier  for firms  to declare  bankruptcy  and
for the first time allowed  enterprises  to lay off workers. Under  the 1989  law, laid-off  workers  were  in effect
entitled  to 24 months  advance  notice;  changes  introduced  in February  of 1991  reduced  the  amount  of required  notice
to six months. The government  also introduced  early retirement  subsidies  in 1989.
3declined substantially.  Unemployment  inflows due to  layoffs emerged only in October 1991 (the
February 1991 law shortened  the notification  period to six months)  and dramatically  increased  in 1992.
Given  the large  declines in employment  and the large growth  in unemployment  during  this period,
it is hardly  surprising that the job opportunities  for most individuals  have been sharply curtailed  (Table
1, panel F).  Among those who entered employment  in 1987, 61.9 percent found employment  in the
formal sector within 12 months; among those who entered unemployment  in 1990, only 40.8 percent
found a formal sector  job within the same  period of time, a decline  of about a third.  The data for 1991
show a slight increase, an early sign of a light at the end of the tunnel. 2
2.  HOW THE UNEMPLOYMENT  INSURANCE  SYSTEM WORKS
This section describes  the types of benefits and eligibility  rules for unemployment  insurance  in
Slovenia. It proceeds  with the arguments  that lead one to believe  that the Slovenian  system during
1990-1992  encouraged  unemployed  to wait until their unemployment  insurance  benefits  lapsed  before
taking a job.
Description  of the system
Unlike  other socialist  economies, Yugoslavia  allowed  the existence  of open unemployment,
and set up a system of unemployment  insurance  to cope with it, in the early 1970s. During the
period covered in our analysis  (1990-1992)  and since  then, unemployed  workers have had the right
to:
a)  Unemployment  compensation;
b)  Unemployment  assistance;
c)  Training;
2  Slovenia's  production  has been  on the rise since  the  last  quarter  of 1993,  reaching  a remarkable
5 percent  in 1994. Unemployment  peaked  at the  end of 1993  and  has been  declining  since  then.
4d)  Reimbursement  for moving  expenses  connected  with employment;  and
e)  Health and old age insurance.
Those who leave their jobs and those dismissed  for disciplinary  reasons are not covered  by
the insurance. The level of the benefit depends on the individuals'  previous earnings, and the
potential  length of the benefit on the duration of previous employment. At least nine-months  of
uninterrupted  employment  has been required, yielding  three months of potential  duration of the
benefit. The maximum  potential  duration has been two years, with extensions  up to five years for
workers near pensionable  age.
After their right to unemployment  compensation  expires, unemployed  workers are eligible  for
income-tested  unemployment  assistance. The same amount is paid to all (80 percent of the minimum
wage), and the benefit is payable for up to three years from the date the person first receives
unemployment  compensation. Similarly, income-tested  assistance  is extended  to those who become
unemployed  after successfully  finishing  an internship. 3 There is also an income-tested  program of
social assistance,  the assistance  of the last resort.
The unemployed  lose the benefit if they obtain a job, refuse a job offer or training, fail to
visit employment  office if invited, or retire.  The job that eliminates  the benefits, however, has to be
a "regular"  job -- a job that offers a rich bundle of fringe benefits (above  all, pension and health
insurance, and regular leave) and worker rights, although  it need not be for indefinite  period. The
unemployed  could collect Ul benefits and also legally  work, even full time, under the so-called
contract  employment. This type of employment  not only allowed  the unemployed  to "double-dip,"
but also enabled employers  to avoid  a good portion of taxes and contributions  on wages. To be sure,
the labor code very rigidly defines  under what circumstances  one could be employed  under the
3  VWhile  on the  job for less  than  6 to 12  months,  graduates  of high  schools  and universities  are  called
"interns."  Their  pay is reduced,  and  they  have  to pass  an internal  exam  in order to retain  a job -- which  is not  a
guarantee  that they  do.
5contract (for example, if demand for labor is seasonal). But its enforcement  has been minimal,  and
so breaches  were widespread.
Aware of deficiencies  of the UI system and under pressure from the public, Slovenian
legislators  in 1993 and 1994  enacted  several laws aimed at preventing  double-dipping  of the above
sort.  First, in December 1993 they introduced  a law which barred the receipt of unemployment
benefits  for those months when monthly  pay from irregular work exceeded  twice the minimum
monthly level of unemployment  compensation  (amounting  to just under the average  wage of the
economy). For irregular pay below that amount, there is no reduction of benefits. Second, to
discourage  contract employment,  taxes imposed  on it were raised to match the tax and contribution
rate of regular employment. Third, taxes and contributions  on wages of previously  unemployed
workers were waived for the length of the unutilized  entitlement  to unemployment  compensation,  a
kind of benefit transfer program (see below).
In February 1991, in the middle of the period of this study, there was also a change  in the
unemployment  insurance  law.  Though broadly similar in concept, the February 1991  law does
deviate in certain respects from the statute previously  on the books. It is in some ways less generous
to displaced individuals  than the earlier law:  (1) workers  who have become  unemployed  due to
bankruptcy  have had both the level and the duration  of their benefits  reduced  (previously,  their
replacement  rate was 80 percent, and the duration of their eligibility  for unemployment  compensation
was double  that provided in the current statute); and (2) it reduces  the length of unemployment
compensation  for workers with 15 to 20 years of work experience  to 18 months (previously  24
months). In some other respects, the new law is more generous:  (1) the replacement  rate for the first
three months of unemployment  is increased  to 70 percent (up from 60 percent); and (2) the maximum
duration of unemployment  assistance  is increased  to three years (up from two years).  Table 2
presents the details of the system before and after the February 1991  change of the law.
6Reflecting  the increased  number of workers  with previous  work history among those entering
unemployment,  the share of unemployed  workers covered  by unemployment  insurance  increased
during the transition. For example, the share of unemployed  receiving  unemployment  compensation
has increased  from 20.2 percent at the beginning  of 1990  to 40.9 percent by September 1992.
During  the same period, the percentage  of those receiving  unemployment  compensation  increased
from 9.4 to 12.3, and those receiving  unemployment  compensation  after internship  from 3.8 to 6.8.
Micklewright  and Nagy (1994a) observed  a decreasing  trend of the share of recipients  of Ul in
Hungary, but in a later period (from July 1992  to April 1994).
Qualification  rules for benefits produce  a large variance  in the length of the potential
eligibility  for benefits -- a feature most welcome  in analysis  of the incentive  effects of compensation.
They range from 3 months to 24 months, and even beyond 24 months for unemployment  assistance.
Unemployment  compensation  entitlements  are fairly equally  distributed  over the potential  length of
entitlements,  with a distinct peak at the longest, 24-month  duration  (nearly one third of entitlements
over 1990-92  were of that length).
Once assessed,  the level of Ul entitlements  was periodically  adjusted  to account  for changes  in
inflation. Figure I depicts the possible range of unemployment  compensation  as a percent of the
average wage of the economy. Because  adjustments  were done in an ad-hoc  way, they produced  an
irregular pattern of periodic increases  at the time of adjustment  and gradual erosion of the benefits  by
wage growth.
Does the Slovenian  system discourage  exits to employment?
In principle,  the effects of unemployment  insurance  on probability  of exit from unemployment
are ambiguous. In the model of Moffit and Nicholson  (1982), for example, higher unemployment
benefits increase  the value of leisure. This, in turn, increases  reservation  wage and reduces  job
search intensity,  and hence reduces  job-taking propensity  and prolongs  the duration of unemployment.
7Moreover, the kink in the budget constraint  at the point when benefits lapse in the model suggests  that
one should  observe a much larger job-finding  rate just before  the benefits lapse. On the other hand,
it is conceivable  that higher unemployment  benefits increase  the job-finding  rate.  Increased  benefits
may decrease  the worker's costs of future layoffs if actuarial return exceeds  the costs (when the state
also contributes  to the unemployment  fund, for example),  and may also provide resources  for a more
effective  job search.
Although  the evidence  pointing  to disincentive  effects is mounting,  Atkinson  and
Micklewright  (1991) insist that it is institutional  aspects  that are critical to the economic  impact  of the
benefits. 4 They show that when unrealistic  assumptions  underlying  a standard  job search model are
relaxed, the theoretical  predictions about  the disincentive  effects of unemployment  insurance  may be
reversed. It is institutional  details that matter, and so it is the matter of empirical analysis  to find out
how the system works in a particular economy.
Following  this institutional approach, I argue -- and show empirically below -- that the
Slovenian  Ul system is particularly  likely to negatively  affect the rate of jobtaking. Similar forces are
at work in other transition economies. In these economies,  the trade-off between  income from
(formal)  employment  and insured unemployment  that underlies  predictions  of Moffit and Nicholson  is
particularly  skewed in favor of the insured, "formal"  unemployment. In fact, many  of the
unemployed  workers in transition  economies  are engaged  in a kind of "double  dipping:  "  they collect
unemployment  compensation  or assistance  and work at the same time under informal  employment
(employment  paid in cash and without a formal contract, thus avoiding  taxes and contributions  levied
on the payroll), or even under formal  employment,  as described  above  for Slovenia. By doing that,
the unemployed  may even not violate a law.  Through such an arrangement,  both the worker and the
employer  are better off: the unemployed  receives  double  payments,  and the employer  avoids paying
4  The  same  reference  provides  a recent  survey  of disincentive  effects  of Ul systems.
8payroll taxes (and possibly  pays lower wages). In terms of the model of Moffit and Nicholson,  the
slope of the budget  constraint in the income-unemployment  space is nearly flat, and so the utility of
maximizing  the duration of unemployment  is very large.
To start with, in transition  economies  there are many  possibilities  for informal employment.
Although  the official sanctioning  of private ownership  removed  the principal  rationale  for the
existence  of the informal sector under communism,  evidence  suggests  that the informal sector is
thriving. New types of informal activities  have emerged  due to possibilities  of windfall  gains under
the still underdeveloped  and inefficient  formal sector.  Moreover, labor laws are violated  and taxes
are avoided  and underreported,  because  the law enforcement  capacity  of these economies  is weak.
There is also a more subtle point about who makes  the decision  to engage in informal
employment. Having the upper hand in negotiating  the terms of appointment,  employers  often force
the unemployed  to take informal  employment  until their benefits  expire and only then are willing  to
grant formal employment  which brings a range of fringe benefits.'
Another  reason for the prevalence  of "double  dipping"  are loopholes  and deficiencies  of labor
and unemployment  insurance  laws.  As discussed  above, recipients  of unemployment  compensation  in
Slovenia  can receive unemployment  insurance  payments  and legally  work. (Since December 1993, the
benefit is taken away if irregular earnings  exceed a certain threshold.) And very suggestive  is the fact
that double-dipping  in the above sense was not only perfectly  legal, it was also perceived  as legitimate
by the unemployed,  as discussions  with employment  counselors  in Slovenia  led me to believe. Also,
if the decision  to cancel benefits  has been challenged  at the court, the burden of the proof rests with
employment  offices, instead of leaving  to the unemployed  to prove that he or she has not violated  the
law.
Last but not least, in Slovenia  the costs of being  detected of abusing  unemployment  insurance
5  Heads  of regional  employment  offices  in Slovenia  have  told  me  of such  behavior.
9are low.  The worker has to repay the received  unjustified  benefits, but there are no violation  fines.
Also, the "shoe-leather"  costs of keeping  the status of insured  unemployment  imposed  in the form of
search  requirements  have been small because  employment  offices  have been overloaded  with work.
Since  the beginning  of transition in 1989  till 1994, employment  offices  have not increased  their staff,
although  the number  of unemployed  increased many  times, and the scope of their work also
increased.
Because  "double-dipping"  has been legally  allowed  and because  costs of remaining  in
"formal"  unemployment  are low, the Slovenian  system of unemployment  insurance  seemed  to
encourage  the unemployed  to stay in insured, "formal"  unemployment  until benefits lapsed. This
prediction  is examined below.
3. DATA SOURCES
The Employment  Office of Slovenia's records on registered  unemployed  are the main source
of data for this study.  For each unemployment  spell, information  was provided  on the following
issues:
a)  starting and ending  dates,
b)  destination  of exit (job vs. exit from labor force),
c)  date and reason of termination  of last employment,  if applicable,  and
d)  personal characteristics  of the worker.
We have information  on all unemployment  spells that were in progress as of December  31,
1986  or began  between December  31, 1986 and mid-April 1993, altogether  about 325,000 records.
For a subsample  of registrations  between  January 1990  and October 1992, we also have the
receipt of unemployment  insurance  benefits, consisting  of the type of benefit (unemployment
compensation,  unemployment  assistance,  or unemployment  assistance  after internship)  and starting
10and ending  date of eligibility. This data set was provided  separately  and was merged with
unemployment  spell records by personal identifiers  and date of registration  at the employment  office.
The accuracy of information  on exits from unemployment  -- a particular  problem for the
administrative  data obtained  from employment  offices -- is ensured by a requirement  that, when they
find a job, unemployed  workers have to retrieve the "work  booklet" from employment  offices  and
bring it to their new employer, thus signaling  employment  offices  information  on exit.  Moreover, the
coverage  of the data is reasonably  good since unemployed  workers in Slovenia  have had strong
incentives  to register at employment  offices. 6 According  to the Slovenian  labor force survey, in 1989
and 1990, 77 percent of those unemployed  according  to the International  Labor Organiation  (ILO)
definition  were also registered with employment  offices, and in 1991  this proportion  increased  to 83
percent.  Missing  from the registers  are probably school-leavers  early in their job hunt.
Two features of the data recorded in the unemployment  register should  be noted. First, exits
from unemployment  to employment  include  only exits to formal  jobs, though these may be jobs either
within  the social or private sector.  Exits for persons  who find work under "contract  employment"
(see above) or in the gray economy  are not recorded. For example, according  to the Slovenian  labor
force survey, 42 percent of registered unemployed  were performing  paid work of at least one hour in
the reference  week in 1990. Second, the 1992  data on unemployment  spells for young  persons are
not entirely comparable  to those for earlier years.  In cases where a young person registers  as
unemployed,  leaves unemployment  to take a fixed-term  internship,  and then re-registers  as
unemployed,  the second unemployment  registration  date is overwritten  on that individual's  original
6  For  those  who  have  lost  a job, incentives  are  the  most  powerful,  since  even  a previous  nine-month
employment  makes  them  eligible  for  unemployment  compensation  (see  above).  Other  incentives  include  employment
office  services  (counseling,  training,  employment  subsidies);  lower  likelihood  that  a spouse  will  be laid  off, since
having  an unemployed  member  of the family  influence  redundancy  decisions;  ability  to enroll in evening  post-
elementary  education  (only  day-time  enrollment  is permitted  otherwise);  subsidies  for child  care;  priority  in queues
for renting or buying  apartments;  eligibility  for child  allowances;  and eligibility  for voluntary  old-age  insurance.
11unemployment  record.  Fixed-term  internships  typically  last nine months. Thus, in order to assure
strict comparability,  in pre-1992 data but not in post-1992  data pre-internship  unemployment  spells
experienced  by young people who re-register  as unemployed  following  completion  of their internship
generally  should have been erased. Although  this means  that the 1992  unemployment  inflow  data are
not wholly comparable  to those for earlier years, this is not a serious problem.
The Slovenian  data compare  favorably  with data used in other studies of the effects of
unemployment  insurance. First, both recipients  and non-recipients  of unemployment  insurance  are
included. Second, it covers a complete  duration of a spell, not only the portion  in insured
unemployment,  and it distinguishes  between  exits to employment  and non-employment.  Third, it
covers the period both before and after the change of the UI law.  The change  provides exogenous
variation  in benefits and thus helps identify  the effects of potential  duration  on job exit rate.
4.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Non-parametric  analysis
One way to explore a possible association  between  unemployment  insurance  and duration  of
unemployment  is by comparing  survival function  for different groups of unemployed,  that is, using
non-parametric  analysis. I use Kaplan-Meier  survival  functions,  showing  the probability  of still being
unemployed  at a given duration of unemployment  spell (see, for example, Kalbfleisch  and Prentice,
1980). I focus on escapes  from unemployment  to employment,  and thus treat escapes  to out of labor
force as censored  observations  (together  with true censored  observations).
Let us first examine  possible differences  in surviving  in unemployment  among  recipients  and
non-recipients  of unemployment  compensation  (Figure 2).  The two survival  functions  differ from
each other with statistical  significance. The function  for non-recipients  is below the one for the
recipients,  indicating  higher cumulative  exit to employment. But for durations  of more than 24
12months, the difference becomes smaller, and it virtually disappears at 36 months.  Note that for a
majority of unemployed, 36 months is the longest potential duration of Ul (if unemployment
compensation is followed by unemployment assistance).
Further insights may he obtained by comparing survival in unemployment among the
unemployment compenisation recipients grouped by potential length of the entitlement.  Figure 3 plots
a survival function ftor six groups of workers:  those with three,  six, nine, twelve, eighteen,  and
twenty four-months of potential duration of unemployment compensation, respectively.  Workers who
continued receiving unemployment assistance after exhausting unemployment compensation were
excluded.  The figure discerins a remarkable pattern: the longer the potential duration, the longer the
survival in unemployment.  Such a pattern persists throughout the time period studied (three years).
Not only that, survival function of all groups of workers exhibits substantial decline just before and at
the point of exhaustion of eligibility (for example. at three months tor the group with three-month
potential eligibility).
To pursue the behavior near the point of exhaustion of the benefits further,  I follow Meyer
(1990).  He constructed an empirical estimator analogous to the Kaplan-Meier estimator but having on
the time axis time betore benefits lapse instead of time since a spell began.  This hazard computed for
Slovenian recipients for  1990-92 is presented in Figure 4.  The most striking feature of the figure is a
dramatic increase of the empirical hazard at the month when benefits lapse and particularly one month
before -- the finding similar to the one of Meyer for the l1.S.  The irregular shape of the hazard in
months before the exhaustion reflects differences in hazards among the new cohorts that enter  at
certain points (at three.  six, twelve, fifteen and eighteen) as opposed the ones that already survived in
unemployment for some time.
What do the above observations suggest?  The fact that more non-recipients exit
unemployment to employment early in their unemployment spell does not prove a "waiting" behavior
13on their part -- although  it is not inconsistent  with it.  Recipients  and non-recipients  differ in
observable  and non-observable  characteristics. Chief among  those is probably  age, with recipients,
on average, being  much older than non-recipients,  many of whom are school-leavers. The difference
in the escape rate may well reflect those characteristics  and not the effect of Ul.  Similarly,  systematic
differences  in survivor function  among  groups with different potential  duration of entitlements  do not
necessarily  reflect disincentive  effects. These groups again differ in their characteristics  -- after all,
workers  are classified into different  groups because  of differences  in their work histories. But the
particular  pattern of the exit just before the exhaustion,  namely  its sharp increase, does demonstrate
waiting  behavior.
As mentioned,  the law of February 1991  reduced the amount  of unemployment  insurance  for
some groups of workers (above all, for those becoming  unemployed  due to bankruptcy). For these
groups,  the change in the law provides a natural experiment. It is tempting  to compare survival
functions  of affected  workers, divided into two groups by date of registration  as unemployed  to detect
incentive  effects of of the Ul system. Workers of affected  groups  who registered  as unemployed
under the new law stayed unemployed  for a shorter time than their counterparts  who registered  under
the old law.
Difference in the pattern of survival  in unemployment  for the affected  groups  before and after
the change  of the law, however, cannot be taken as a proof of disincentive  effects. This conclusion
follows  only if other things remained  equal - but they did not.  For one thing, in the latter part of the
period under consideration,  the exit rate from unemployment  to employment  increased  also for groups
of workers not affected  by the change in the law (Figure 5).  For another  thing, it seems plausible
that before February  1991 -- but not after that -- bankruptcy was often used to get rid of redundant
workers. Hence, a firm laying off a worker was subject  to extremely  high costs in terms of
severance  pay (see above). On the other hand, firms declaring  bankruptcy  had no obligations  to
14departing workers and so had strong incentives  to use the bankruptcy  route to lay off workers. Some
firms later reemployed  some laid off workers, presumably  younger. more productive  ones.  The
February 1991  law reduced the costs of layoffs  to be borne by firms, and thus their incentives  to use
bankruptcy  as a method  of workforce reduction. The main change  was that prior notice of
redundancy  was cut from 24 to 6 months.
A comparison  of survival in unemployment  by groups  differentiated  by the date of becoming
unemployed  cannot account for all possible  differences  in the circumstances  and composition  of
groups. We turn to a more sophisticated,  parametric analysis.
Parametric analysis
We are interested  in estimating  the probability  that an individual  moves from unemployment
to employment. If we know that the individual  has already been in state i for t periods, the
probability  that he or she leaves  that state at time t, X(t), can be specified  as:
A(t) =  f(t)/S(t)  (I)
where X(t)  is the hazard function, S(t) =  11  -F(t)I is the survivor function, F(t) = Pr(T <t)  specifies
the probability  distribution  that random  variable T is less than some value t, and f(t) is the
corresponding  density function.
The hazard  depends on how long the individual  has been in state i, on the characteristics  of
individuals  in that state, and on environment  (state of the economy,  for example). Given the
advantages  of semi-parametric  hazard models,  the Cox proportional  hazard model is used, with the
functional  form of the hazard specified  as follows:'
X(t,X) = \)(t)expjX(t)Oj,  (2)
7  Meyer  (1990)  cites  several  advantages  of semi-parametric  models,  among  others,  the reduction
of the  bias in the parameter  estimates  of covariates  in the case  of unobserved  heterogeneity.
15where X 0 is the  "baseline" hazard, and X(t) is a set of explanatory variables -- covariates.  The latter
may include time-varying factors -- a feature especially important when exploring time effects of
unemployment insurance.
To account for the effects of entitlements arising from the approaching exhaustion of
unemployment benefits, we again follow Meyer (1990) and introduce a series of "spline" dummy
variables.  The coefficients of these variables are marginal effects of moving one period (in this case,
one month) closer to the exhaustion of the benefit or further beyond the exhaustion.  To save on the
number of variables introduced. we focus on the effect of the main type of unemployment insurance
benefit -- unemployment compensation.  The spline dummies are defined as follows:
SPLN-2 =  I if a recipient of unemployment compensation is unemployed during the month
starting onef  month after the exhaustion of the benefit, or in any month after that: 0 otherwise. (The
coefficient of this dummy retlects the cumulative effect of remaining in unemployment beyond one
month after the exhaustion.)
SPL-I  =  I if a recipient of unemployment compensation is unemployed during the month
after the exhaustion of the benefit, or in any month after that, 0 otherwise.
SPLO =  I if a recipient ot unemployment compensation is unemployed during a month before
the exhaustion of  the benefit, or in any month after that; 0 otherwise.
SPLI  =  I if a recipient of unemployment compensation is unemployed during a month
ending one month before the exhaustion of the benefit, or in any month after that; 0 otherwise.
Variables SPL2 to SPL24 are defined in the same fashion.
The results of the hazard estimation are presented in Tables 3 and 4.  For estimation, I have
randomly selected a  15-percent sample from the universe of all unemployed who registered between
January 1990 and October  1992, a total of 23,242 individuals.  Let us first examine the estimates for
control variables, those representing human capital and personal characteristics.  Their performance
16makes good intuitive sense and is consistent with findings about the returns to skills and gender
during the transition (see Orazem and Vodopivec,  1995).  More skilled and younger workers have
significant advantages in finding a job.  Similar results are found for Hungary by Micklewright and
Nagy (1994b).  The differences among the groups are systematic, with increases in education and
experience, and reductions of age,  consistently yielding higher success rates in job finding.  The only
exception are the unemployed with less than three years of experience, whose hazard is larger than
the hazard for those with three to four years of experience.  The least experienced have been helped
by targeted job-subsidy programs.  The effects of experience and age work against each other, with
the effects of age prevailing.  Surprisingly, the results show that women have been equally likely to
find a job.  Non-Slovenians, however,  have had significantly lower escape rates than Slovenians.  In
the climate of growing ethnic tensions that tore the country apart,  ethnic discrimination is not
unexpected.  The hazard of jobfinding  is also strongly influenced by the source of unemployment.
Among the groups with a much larger success rate are labor market entrants,  helped by government-
sponsored internship program,  and the unemployed whose previous employer went bankrupt.
The unemployment insurance variables, the focus of our analysis, tell a clear and consistent
story.  The probability finding a job is significantly lower for  recipients than for non-recipients.  The
coefficients of the three variables indicating the receipt of different types of benefit (one for
unemployment compensation,  one for unemployment assistance following the expiration of
unemployment compensation,  and one for unemployment assistance for former  interns) are all
negative and strongly significant.  Moreover and of utmost importance, the spline dummies. which
capture the effects of the remaining potential duration of unemployment compensation.  show that the
hazard dramatically increases just before the exhaustion and equally dramatically falls immediately
after the exhaustion of benefits.
More precisely,  holding other variables constant, the effects of approaching and moving
17beyond  the exhaustion  of benefits on the hazard are as follows: at segments  far away from the
exhaustion,  the hazard is virtually  unaffected  by time effects (most of the coefficients  of SPL24 to
SPL3 are insignificant  -- see Table 4, model 1).  But the coefficients  of spline  dummies  dramatically
increase  two months before and particularly  one month before  the exhaustion,  with yet an additional
increase  at the month  when benefits are exhausted. During  the month following  the exhaustion,  the
increase  of the hazard rate of the preceding  three months is almost  completely  wiped out.  The further
effects of moving away from the exhaustion  beyond one month  are insignificant.
Note that the increases in empirical hazard between  24 and 21 months before  the exhaustion
and other increases  at points of entry of new cohorts with lower potential  duration  observed in Figure
4 are not matched  by a similar increase in the coefficients  of the spline dummies. The spline
variables reflect  pure effects of time distance  from the exhaustion,  and the increases  of the empirical
hazard at points of entry of new cohorts are captured  by other explanatory  variables.
To allow for differences in hazard rates among  the cohorts that enter unemployment  at
different points relative to the exhaustion  of benefits  (depending  on maximum  duration of
entitlements),  I introduced  additional  dummy  variables, interactions  of the spline dummies  with
dummies  identifying  the cohorts of different maximum  duration of unemployment  compensation. In
interactions,  I exclude the potential  duration of 24 months, so the coefficients  of interactive  dummies
show deviations  from the hazard for that group.  To reduce the number  of dummies,  spline dummies
for remaining  unemployed  at segments  more distant than three months from the exhaustion  are
combined  by quarters. The interactive  dummies  are of the form
MiSPLj,  i =  3, 6, 9,  12, 18;
j  =  -2,  -1,0,  1...,  18, i <  j±l
The results for this model are presented  in Tables 3 and 4, model 2.  The basic story about
the effects  of the remaining  entitlement  duration  on the hazard  as told by coefficient  of the spline
18dummies  (SPL-2 to SPL24) remains  unchanged. The hazard increases  strongly during the month
before the exhaustion  of benefits  and falls sharply thereafter.  Interactive  dummies  add to this picture
in two aspects. First, groups with a shorter potential  duration  wait "to the last minute"  before taking
a job.  For these groups, the hazard within a month of the exhaustion  is significantly  larger than the
hazard for the groups with the longest  duration, the 24- and 18-months  groups. Second and of lesser
statistical  significance,  at the segments  where new groups with shorter entitlement  enter
unemployment,  the hazard of these groups  tend to be lower than the one of groups  that have already
survived  through more distant segments  of unemployment.
What can we say about the effects of the change in the law'? Does a cut in potential  benefit
length  reduce the duration of unemployment? The results confirm such effects. The above
parametrization  of the effects of the distance from the exhaustion  of the benefits  isolates  pure waiting
effects, and there is no reason to believe  that the groups affected  by changes  behave  differently.
Nonetheless  I also estimated  a model that tries to identify  the effects of the change of the law on the
affected  groups directly. I followed  the "differences  in differences"  approach  and added  to the basic
model three dummies: one indicating  the period when the benefits were granted (I if after, 0
otherwise);  one for the treatment group (1 if affected  by the change of the law, 0 otherwise),  and one
for the interaction  between  the period and the treatment  group.  It is the coefficient  of the interactive
dummy  that tells us about the effects of the change of the law (see Hunt, 1992).
I applied this approach  to two groups.  One is unemployed  due to bankruptcy,  for which both
level and length of unemployment  was cut under the new law.  Because  there are reasons to believe
that different experience  groups were treated  differently  before the change of the law (see above),  I
formed  separate treatment  groups by experience  categories. The law did not affect the group with
experience  above 20 years, so it is not included  among  the treatment  groups. The second group is the
recipients  of the unemployment  benefit in their third month of unemployment  who were granted
19benefits after the change of the law.  Recall that under the new law, the replacement rate falls after
three months from 70 to 60 percent; there was no such a gradation before the change of the law.
The results show that the difference in the hazard for the unemployed due to bankruptcy who
registered after the cliange in the law is indeed positive. significantly so for the two high-end
experience groups.'  Changes in the replacement rate. however, are found not to influence the job-
taking rate.  The drop of replacemenit rate from 70 percent to 60 percent after the third month has no
effect on the hazard; in fact, the coefficient on the interaction between the dummy for receiving
unempiloyment  comiipenisationi  in the third month and the period dummy is negative, even significantly
so.
How should we interpret these results'?  Of course, one can make a case that it is not the
disincentive et'fects. but r ather heterogeneity -- because we control for observed heterogeneity,  it
would be the unobserved heterogenieity this time -- that is responsible for a lower overall hazard of
exit of the recipients of insurance benefit.  But the identitied effects of duration by spline dummies
coniclusively  confirm the waiting pattern detected by empirical hazard.
5.  POLICY  IMPLICATIONS
The paper has shown that during  1990-92 there was a tendency among the recipients of
unemployment compenisationi  in Slovenia to stay (tormally) unemployed until their benefits expired
betfore  taking a job.  Institutional  set-up suggests -- and labor surveys show -- that many of the
recipienits  were actually working while collecting Ul benefits.  In spirit, if not in the letter of the law,
the Ul system was abused.
A hetter specificatioin  of the test would  compare  differences  in the hazard rate throughout  time
distanice  fronm  the exihaustioni,  readjusting  the potential  eligibility  for the treatment  group that registered  after the
chanige  of the law so as to iginore  the chaniges  in the law.  Such specification,  however,  would  be conmputationally
Iimuch  more deinanidiiig.
20The tendency to wait was produced  by the design of the Ul system. Legislative  loopholes  and
non-enforcement  of the labor code allowed  the unemployed  to work and to collect UI benefits.
Monitoring  of job search of the recipients  of UI was lax.  And the environment  of transition
economies  in general seems to be conducive  to misuse of the Ul system because  there are abundant
possibilities  for informal employment.
To be sure, that Slovenian  "unemployed"  have been working  means  that resources  were not
wasted, an obvious  welfare improvement. But the "rent" these unemployed  have  been receiving  in
the form of UI benefits is unjustified. Indeed, for a significant  number  of unemployed,  the reduction
of duration of benefits would reduce both the length  of insured unemployment  and of unemployment.
This would reduce UI expenditure  and the inefficiencies  generated  by raising  taxes to finance  it
without  impairing  job matches or crowding  out jobs for non-recipients. For those who could  not
ensure employment  under the shortened  entitlements,  however, their incomes  and hence  welfare
would  be reduced, possibly  to the level where they would have to resort to social assistance. Across-
the-board  cutting of the potential  duration  of Ul benefits  thus faces a trade-off between  improved
efficiency  and increased  hardship for the least mobile  groups -- a trade-off  that can only be solved  in
the political sphere.
Redesigning  the system by better targeting  would  be less controversial. For example,  one
way to reduce Ul expenditures  without seriously  hurting incentives  to work is to reduce the benefits
in proportion  to earnings  from irregular work. 9 Another  possibility  is stricter monitoring  of the  job
search by the unemployed. Moreover, to reduce expenditures  and in particular, to make "double
dipping"  less attractive, it would make sense to take away old-age insurance  from the package of
benefits offered  by the Ul system.  Furthermore,  to be able to make impartial  decisions  about
9  It is doubtful  that  the December  1993  change  of the  Slovenian  Ul law  has teeth:  the threshold  it
sets  is relatively  high,  and the  ability  to monitor  earnings  -- the  task  of already  overburdened  employment  offices  -
- is weak.
21disqualification  for benefits, this function should  be taken away from counselors  who help the
unemployed  finding a job and may thus develop  too close a relationship  with the unemployed.
Radical  changes in value systems during the transition -- the changes  not yet matched  by
creating  appropriate  institutions  to deal with them -- contribute  to further erosion of law and order in
these societies." 0 Such an environment  is particularly  conducive  to rent-seeking. Therefore, in
addition  to better targeting, a "benefit  transfer program" -- a voluntary  program which converts  UI
benefits, via vouchers, into hiring subsidies  -- seems particularly  attractive  for Slovenia  and transition
economies  in general."' Such a program would, in a way, legalize "double-dipping"  that has been
taking place in Slovenia  and possibly  in other economies  as well.  It would legalize  practices  that have
undermined  the credibility  of the system, and it may even offer fiscal savings over the present system
leaving  incentives  to take a job intact.
10  Above  all, individuals  have  become  much  more  materialistically  oriented  (see  Musek,  1994).
11  'MTe  program  has recently  gained  popularity  in many  countries,  including  U.K. and Australia  (for
a description  and strong  endorsement  of the  program,  see Snower,  1995).
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23TABLE 1:  LABOR MARKET TRENDS, SLOVENIA,  1987-1992
1  19871  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
A.  Real wage rate (yearly average,  1987=100)
Total  100  89.3  103.2  76.5  68.1  62.1
B.  Estimated formal sector employment as of the start of the calendar yeae
Total  |  826,495  |  835,722  |  831,347  |  823,224  767,710  700,825
C.  Probability of exit from employment during calendar year among persons employed as of the start of the
calendar year_
Job-to-job  7.2  6.6  6.6  5.0  4.8  n.a.
Job-to-unemployment  0.4  0.6  0.8  2.3  4.0  n.a.
Job-to-retirement  1.8  2.0  2.0  4.0  2.8  n.a.
Job-to-other  2.8  2.8  3.3  4.7  5.3  n.a.
Total  12.1  12.0  12.7  16.0  16.9  n.a.
D.  Stock of unemploymenL  as of the start of the calendar year
Total  |  14,068 [  18,195 [  26,788  34,699  |  55,060  |  93,036
E.  Inflows into unemployment during calendar  year
New entrant  6,613  7,555  8,483  10,016  13,964  21,915
Reentrant  3,053  3,700  4,026  4,525  6,121  6,632
Dismissed from previous job  1,034  1,379  2,451  2,544  1,341  1,151
Laid off from previous job  - - --  - 4,052  21,283
Previous employer bankrupt  606  485  1,472  8,674  18,852  5,016
Internship ended  553  871  930  3,058  7,718  8,236
Fixed term job ended  4,728  6,242  5,953  9,774  10,647  10,163
Quit previous job  3,930  3,885  4,331  5,301  5,248  6,353
Other  1,735  2,318  1,852  2,639  5,676  3,871
Total  22,252  26,435  29,498  46,531  73,619  84,620
F.  Probability of exit from unemployment to employment within 12 months among persons entering
unemployment during the calendar  year
Total  |  61.9  |  54.9  48.0  40.8  41.4  n.a.
Data sources: Statistical Yearbook of Slovenia,  1993 (wages); Abraham and Vodopivec (1993), data on employment and
probability of exit from employment;  data source on unemployed is described in the text.
24Table 2:  Unemployment  Insurance Legislation, 1990-92
Before February 1991  After February 1991
Unemployment  Eli2ibilitv: Quitters and those dismissed for disciplinary reasons ineligible.  Eligibility: Quitters and those dismissed for disciplinary reasons incligible.
compensation
Duration:  Duration:
- 3 months for at least nine months of uninterrupted employment, or for  --  3 months for at least nine months of uninterrupted employment, or for
at least 12 months of employment with interruptions during the last 18  at least 12 months of employment  with interruptions  during the last 18
months;  months;
l  - 6 months for at least 30 months of uninterrupted employment, or for 50  --  6 months for at least 30 months of uninterrupted employment, or for 50
months of employment  with interruptions during the last five years;  months of employment with interruptions during the last five years;
l  --  9 months for employment above five years, but less than ten years;  --  9 months for employment  above five years, but less than ten years;
l  --  12 months for employment above ten years, but less than 15 years;  --  12 months for employment  above ten years, but less than 15 years;
l  - 24 months, for employment  above 15 years.  --  18 months for employment  above 15 years, but less than 20 years; and
--  24 months for employment  above 20 years.
Longer durations for those unemployed  due to a bankruptcy:
s  |  - 6 months for at least nine months of uninterrupted employment, or for  Replacement ratio: 70 percent for the first three months, 60 percent thereafter,
Ln  l  at least 12 months of employment in the last 18 months;  with a ceiling of 400 percent of the minimum wage and a floor of 80 percent of
l  --  12 months for 30 months of uninterrupted employment, or for 50  the minimum wage.
months in the last five years;
l  --  18 months for employment above live years, but less than ten years;  Special provisions governing those unemployed duc to bankruptcy eliminated.
l  - 24 months for employment above ten years.
No reduction in benefits for persons with irregular earnings.
Reolacement  ratio:  60 percent, except 80 percent for those unemployed due to
bankruptcy.
No reduction in benefits for persons with irregular earnings.
Unemployment  Eligibility means-tested.  Benefits  equal to minimum wage (plus allowance for  Eligibility means-tested. Benefits equal to 80 percent of minimum wage (plus
assistance  dependents). Maximum duration 2 years (together with unemployment  allowance for dependents).  Maximum duration 3 years (together with
l_________________  . compensation).  unemployment  compensation).
Unemployment  Eligibility means-tested.  Benefits  equal to minimum wage (plus allowance for  Eligibility means-tested. Benefits equal to 80 percent of minimum wage (plus
assistance after  dependents).  Maximum duration 2 years.  allowance for dependents).  Maximum duration 12 months.
internshipTable 3:  Determinants of the Hazard of Exit from Unemployment to Employment




Unruiished elementary  -0.445  -0.451  0.077
(0.056)  (0.056)  (0.266)
Elementary  -0.307  -0.309  0.253
(0.035)  (0.035)  (0.435)
High school  0.094  0.092  0.243
(0.030)  (0.030)  (0.429)
University  0.448  0.448  0.089
(0.043)  (0.043)  (0.284)
Experience
Less than 3 years  0.089  0.092  0.444
(0.045)  (0.046)  (0.497)
5 to 10 years  0.102  0.102  0.141
(0.050)  (0.050)  (0.348)
10 to 15 years  0.278  0.252  0.107
(0.063)  (0.063)  (0.309)
15 to 20 years  0.430  0.447  0.093
(0.073)  (0.073)  (0.291)
More than 20 years  0.434  0.481  0.145
(0.087)  (0.087)  (0.351)
Age
Under 20  0.226  0.222  0.178
(0.044)  (0.043)  (0.383)
20 to 25  0.083  0.087  0.237
(0.036)  (0.036)  (0.425)
30 to 35  -0.111  -0.116  0.117
(0.045)  (0.045)  (0.321)
35 to 40  -0.275  -0.263  0.100
(0.058)  (0.058)  (0.299)
40 to 45  -0.452  -0.442  0.077
(0.070)  (0.070)  (0.266)
45 to 50  -0.657  -0.650  0.061
(0.088)  (0.088)  (0.239)
50 plus  -1.071  -1.068  0.064
(0.103)  (0.103)  (0.245)
Other individual characteristics
Female  -0.023  -0.025  0.457
(0.023)  (0.023)  (0.498)
Having dependents  -0.005  -0.008  0.359
(0.025)  (0.025)  (0.480)
Non-Slovenian  -0.294  -0.299  0.153
(0.034)  (0.034)  (0.360)
26In ill health  -0.974  -0.965  0.029
(0.100)  (0.100)  (0.169)
Source of unemployment
Labor market entrant  1.041  1.058  0.066
(0.050)  (0.050)  (0.248)
Labor market reentrant  -0.066  -0.063  0.098
(0.049)  (0.049)  (0.297)
Firm bankruptcy  0.611  0.625  0.190
(0.046)  (0.046)  (0.392)
Laid off  -0.166  -0.187  0.157
(0.058)  (0.058)  (0.364)
Disciplinary dismissal  0.014  0.011  0.025
(0.071)  (0.071)  (0.156)
Expiration of fixed-term contract  0.227  0.229  0.185
(0.042)  (0.042)  (0.388)
Conclusion of internship  0.240  0.241  0.116
(0.050)  (0.050)  (0.320)
Other source  0.206  0.202  0.060
(0.054)  (0.054)  (0.237)
Effects of unemployment  insurance
Receiving unemployment compensation  -0.865  -0.641  0.359
(0.057)  (0.210)  (0.480)
Receiving unemployment assistance  -0.357  -0.302  0.074
(0.076)  (0.080)  (0.262)
Receiving unemployment assistance after internship  -0.772  -0.716  0.064
(0.076)  (0.050)  (0.245)
-2 [1ogLR  - LogLu]  5030.0  5083.1  a.a.
d. f.  88  114  n.a.
Sample size  23242  23242  n.a.
Completed spells  10258  10258  n.a.
Censored spells  12984  12984  n.a.
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  Excluded categories among dummy variables are vocational education, experience of
3 to 4 years, age of 25 to 30, males, no dependents, Slovenians, of good health, workers who quit the previous job,  hold regular
appointment, and are not receiving unemployment compensation or assistance.  Included in the estimation but not reported are
10 regional and 7 occupational dummies as well as dummies equal to I if individual found a job in a particular quarter between
1990/1 and 1992/111,  and 0 otherwise.
(a)  Included in the model are also spline dummies discussed in the text; they are presented in Table 4.
(b)  Included in the model are also spline dummies and their interactions with cohorts that enter at different time distance
from the exhaustion of benefits; they are presented in Table 4.
27Table 4: Determnntsm of the Hazard of Exit from
Unemployment to Employment:  Effects of the Distance from the Exhaustion of Unemployment Compensatiodh
(standard errors in parentheses)
Modd  (1)  Model (2)
Coefficient  Coefficient of  Coefficient of  Coefficient of  Coefficient of  Coefficient of  Coefficicnt of
of splint  spline  interaction of  inteaction  of  interaction of  interaction of  interaction of
dummies  dumnnies  the splint  te  spline  the splin  the splinc  the splin
with 3-month  with 6-month  with 9-month  with  12-  with 18-
entitlnent  entitlement  entitcemcnt  month  month
cohort  cohont  cohort  entitltement  entitlement
cohort  cohort
SPL-2"  -0.129  1.187  -1.346  -1.598  -1.418  -1.837  -0.534
(0.097)  (0.758)  (0.773)  (0.814)  (0.795)  (0.808)  (0.976)
SPL-I  -1.121  -1.868  1.276  0.626  0.711  0.895  -0.363
(0.123)  (0.801)  (0.790)  (0.833)  (0.812)  (0.822)  (0.990)
SPLO  0.155  -0.767  1.005  0.838  0.978  1.057  0 0.681
(0.080)  (0.341)  (0.368)  (0.404)  (0.391)  (0.410)  (0.450)
SPLI  0.694  1.358  -0.793  -0.685  -0.427  -0.535  -0.685
(0.088)  (0.392)  (0.414)  (0.458)  (0.464)  (0.493)  (0.502)
SPL2  0.324  0.647  - -0.031  -0.353  -0.050  0.209
(0.132)  (0.552)  (0.625)  (0.633)  (0.683)  (0.716)
SPI.3  -0.140  -0.573  -0.228  0.731  0.474  0.151  0.468
(0.125)  (0.494)  (0.458)  (0.557)  (0.555)  (0.603)  (0.649)
SPL4  0.038  - - - - -
(0.104)
SPL5  0.237  - --  - - -
(0.134)
SPL6  -0.082  0.551  - -0.748  -0.425  -0.577  -0.154
(0.121)  (0.279)  (0.370)  (0.311)  (0.326)  (0.378)
SPL7  0.093  - --  - - - _
(0.104)
SPL8  0.080  - - --  - --  -
(0.138)
SPL9  -0.098  -0.047  - - -0.151  0.200  -0.278
(0.124)  (0.276)  (0.358)  (0.308)  (0.359)
SPLI0  0.267  - - - - _  _
(0.103)
SPLI I  -0.188  - - _
(0.  180)
SPL12  -0.122  -0.125  - - - -0.039  0.249
(0.170)  (0.233)  (0.327)  (0.296)
SPL13  0.032  - - - - - -
(0.158)
SPL14  0.183  - - - - - -
(0.210)
SPL15  -0.551  -0.226  - - - - -0.128
(0.172)  (0.190)  (0.240)
28SPL16  0.311
(0.135)
SPLI7  0.318  - -
(0.211)
SPLI1  -0.317  0.018  -0.072
(0.197)  (0.152)  (0.273)
SPLI9  0.527  - - - - - --
(0.192)
SPL20  -0.478  --  -
(0.217)
SPL21  -0.051  -0.200  - - -
(0.162)  (0.119)
SPL22  0.076  - - _  _  _  _
(0.132)
SPL23  -0.132  - --
(0.315)
SPL24  0.040  -0.243  --  --  - --  --
(0.308)  (0.223)
ese  are coefficients from the estimation of the hazard model; the coefficients of other variables included in the model are prewed
in Table 3.
See  text for the definition of variables.
29Table 5:  Effects of the Change of the Law on the Hazard of Exit from Unemployment to Employment for
Unemployed due to Bankruptcy and for Recipients of Unemployment Compensation in their Third Month
(standard errors  in parentheses)
Unemployed  due to  Recipients  of
Bankruptcy  Unemployment
Compensation  in Their
Third Month
Period dummy =  1 if the benefit  granted  after  0.023  0.157
the change of the law  (0.065)  (0.056)
Experience treatment group 1  -0.198  --
(0.167)
Interaction between the experience treatment  0.286  --
group I and the period dummy  (0.212)
Experience treatment group 2  -0.418
(0.165)
Interaction between the experience treatment  0.277  --
group 2 and the period dummy  (0.203)
Experience treatment group 3  -0.441
(0.128)
Interaction between the experience treatment  0.230  --
group 3 and the period dummy  (0.150)
Experience treatment group 4  -0.327
(0.130)
Interaction between the experience treatment  0.319  --
group 4 and the period dummy  (0.146)
Experience treatment group 5  -0.375
(0.132)
Interaction between the experience treatment  0.311
group 5 and the period dummy  (0.145)
Dummy =  I if unemployment compensation received  --  0.001
in the third months  (0.149)
Interaction between the dummy for receiving  --  -0.327
unemployment compensation in the third month  (0.159)
and the period dummy
Note:  Included in the estimation are all covariates of the model 1 as specified in Tables 3 (for the recipients of unemployment
compensation in their third months, also those in Table 4).  Their coefficients are similar to the ones reported in those tables,
so they are omitted here.
30Figure  1:  Range of Unemployment  Compensation,  1990-1992
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Note: Hypothetical  average  of unemployment  compensation  is received  by an unemployed
worker  who,  prior to unemployment,  earned an average  wage  and who started
receiving  the benefit  in January 1990  (at 60% replacement  rate).
Figure 2:  Survival in Unemployment, Recipients of Unemployment
Compensation, and Non-Recipients of Unemployment  Insurance,
I  1  990-1992
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(a) Sample  size: 21,731(18,344-recipients,  13,387-non-recipients).
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I  Included  are 48,151 recipients  of unemployment  compensation  during 1990-92. (Excluded
are those who upon the exhaustion  of unemployment  compensation  transferred  to unemployment
assistance,  as well as recipients  of unemployment  assistance  after internship.)
Sample  size:  48,151  Total
4,494  -3 -months  eligibility
2,587  -6 -months  eligibility
6,600  -9 -months  eligibility
7,098  -12 -months  eligibility
7,680  -18 -months  eligibility
19,687  -24 -months  eligibility
Figure 4:  Empirical Hazard of Exit to Employment, Months before
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9 Negative  values  for the period  after the lapse  of benefits.
32Figure  5:  Survival in Unemployment  of Workers  Not Affected by the
1991 Unemployment  Insurance  Law Change,  1990-1992
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Sample  size: 61,834  (15,370-before  the change  of the law,  46,464-after  the change  of the law).
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